Lìdài Bīngzhì 歷代兵制
Military Systems through the Ages by 陳傅良 (撰)
About the work
A historical-systematic survey of Chinese military institutions from the Western Zhōu xiāngsuì (community-and-district) militia framework through the Sòng, by the Yǒngjiā 永嘉 utilitarian-school philosopher Chén Fùliáng 陳傅良 (1137–1203). 8 juǎn. Treats the xiāngsuì of Zhōu, the Chūnqiū and pre-Qín conscriptions, the Hàn northern-and-southern garrison armies, the Wèi fǔbīng origin, the SuíTáng fǔbīng maturity, the Sòng xiāngbīng / jìnjūn / jìnbīng / jìnyíng differentiation, and the late-Northern-Sòng / early-Southern-Sòng standing-army crisis. The Sòng sections are particularly detailed and constitute one of the canonical critical analyses of the Sòng standing-army problem—Chén identifying the Hóngwǔ-era “small but elite” army of Tàizǔ as the standard against which the swollen 1,410,000-strong post-Huángyòu (1049–1054) army represents catastrophic decline.
Tiyao
By Chén Fùliáng of the Sòng. Fùliáng’s Chūnqiū zhuàn has been catalogued. The work traces the Western Zhōu xiāngsuì method, then the gains and losses of Chūnqiū, Qín, Hàn, Táng, and after. On the Sòng he is especially detailed. He records that Tàizǔ personally established the military system: the Qīnwèi diànjìn (Imperial Guards), the rotating frontier garrisons, the imperial-capital and prefectural mutual-supervision, the troop-deployment, supply-shipment, and bandit-suppression rules—he extracts the major principles.
In the general discussion he says: “In the ancestor-Sòng era, the troops were few but the very best. By the Xiánpíng era (998–1003), the frontier troops grew to 600,000. By the early Huángyòu era (1049), the troops were 1,410,000. Of these, those called ‘soldiers’ but who could not fight—those who carry tribute-grain, perform craft-labor, repair river-dykes, supply the imperial qǐn and miào, raise state horses—are all ‘soldiers.’ The aged and useless eat their ration. Of past dynasties’ armies, none have been so swollen.
“Total household-population annual income, divided by 1,000,000 troops: roughly every ten households support one xiāngbīng; every ten thousand support one ordinary cavalryman. Add the bīngzhí and wèishì allowances—floating expenses several times higher. How can the state not collapse?”
His words are penetrating. Fùliáng, in the Southern Sòng, saw with his own eyes the harm of “weak ruler, arrogant troops”; hence he composed this work, tracing the disease to its root. He may be called one who attended to the urgencies of his time.
Abstract
The Lìdài bīngzhì is the classic Sòng critique of the swollen standing-army system, and one of the founding texts of the Yǒngjiā utilitarian school’s political-economic critique. Composition is undated; Chén Fùliáng’s life-dates 1137–1203 (CBDB) bracket the work. The dating bracket here (1170–1203) reflects the active mature phase of his career, with composition probably in the late 1180s when his Yǒngjiā utilitarian writings cluster.
The work is the principal Sòng-era statement of the structural problem of the Sòng standing-army system: the post-Five-Dynasties principle of preventing warlordism through massive central-state recruitment of mercenaries had, by mid-Northern-Sòng, swollen the army to 1,410,000—an unsustainable burden that Chén traces with statistical precision. The argument is foundational for the modern interpretation of Sòng military finance (e.g., Wáng Zēngyǔ 王曾瑜’s Sòng cháo bīngzhì chūtàn 宋朝兵制初探, Zhōnghuá, 1983).
Translations and research
Standard editions: Wényuāngé Sìkù. Foundational Western treatment: Robert Hartwell, “Financial Expertise, Examinations, and the Formulation of Economic Policy in Northern Sung China,” JAS 30.2 (1971); David A. Graff and Robin Higham, eds., A Military History of China (Westview, 2002), pp. 99–115. The principal Chinese reference is Wáng Zēngyǔ, Sòng cháo bīng-zhì chū-tàn 宋朝兵制初探 (Zhōnghuá shūjú, 1983), which uses Chén Fùliáng as primary source. Christian de Pee, “The Negotiation of Mercantile Conduct in Song China,” Journal of Asian Studies 60.2 (2001), draws on the Yǒng-jiā utilitarian context.
Other points of interest
The 1,410,000 troop figure for the early Huángyòu era (1049) that Chén Fùliáng cites is accepted by most modern Sòng-history scholars as accurate; it implies, on Chén’s per-household calculation, that approximately one in ten Sòng households was directly supporting a soldier—a fiscal-demographic burden no later Chinese dynasty would match.