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無相思塵論

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Text ID
KR6n0111
Date
557–569
Dynasty
陳

Wúxiāng sīchén lùn 無相思塵論

Treatise on the Object [of Cognition] Lacking Characteristics (Ālambana-parīkṣā) by 陳那菩薩 (Dignāga, 造), translated by 真諦 (Paramārtha, 譯)

About the work

A single-fascicle verse treatise (kārikā + brief auto-commentary) by 陳那菩薩 Dignāga (c. 480–540), translated in the Liáng-Chén transition by 真諦 Paramārtha (499–569). Preserved in the Taishō at T31n1619. The work is the earlier of two extant Chinese translations of Dignāga’s Ālambana-parīkṣā (Investigation into the Object of Cognition); the second is KR6n0112 Guān suǒyuányuán lùn 觀所緣緣論 by 玄奘. The two translations stand to each other in the standard Paramārtha-vs-Xuánzàng relation: differing terminology, slightly different verses recorded, and different doctrinal slant.

Structural Division

CANWWW does not record sub-parts for T31N1619 and does not link it to T31N1624 in the related-text list (the relation is preserved only in the doctrinal literature, not in the canon-structure metadata). The Sanskrit Ālambana-parīkṣā survives in an eight-verse recension; the Chinese Wúxiāng sīchén lùn gives a slightly differently-arranged set of verses with brief prose interjections.

Prefaces

The text opens directly with the verses, with no separate preface or translator’s note. The first verses argue that if the paramāṇu (atom; línxū 隣虛 or “near-emptiness”) is held to be the basic causal element of perceptual experience, the perceptual image (shí 識) cannot resemble it (bù shì 不似), and so the atom cannot be the jìng 境 (cognitive object) any more than the sense-organ is. Conversely, if a clustered aggregation of atoms is held to be the cognitive object, the resulting image cannot be caused by it (since the cluster has no real essence — jù wú yǒu tǐ 聚無有體 — being merely a conventional designation). The verses thus run the standard Dignāgan double refutation that drives the Ālambana argument.

Abstract

The Wúxiāng sīchén lùn is one of the most philosophically important short texts in the Indian Yogācāra corpus and the canonical demonstration that perception cannot be of mind-external objects. Dignāga’s argument has been rigorously studied in modern philosophy as a precursor to both phenomenalist and idealist arguments in the European tradition. The Paramārtha translation preserves a recension that differs slightly from both the Xuánzàng version (T31n1624) and the Tibetan version (Tōh. 4205, dMigs pa brtag pa), making it an independent textual witness of considerable importance.

真諦 Paramārtha translated the work between his arrival in China (546) and his death (569), almost certainly during his most productive Chén-dynasty period at Zhìzhǐsì 制旨寺 in Guǎngzhōu (557–569); the dating window adopted reflects this. The translation is one of Paramārtha’s principal contributions to the early-medieval Chinese Yogācāra tradition.

Translations and research

  • Erich Frauwallner, “Dignāgas Ālambanaparīkṣā: Text, Übersetzung und Erläuterungen,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 37 (1930), 174–194 — the principal Western critical edition.
  • Hidenori Kitagawa 北川秀則, Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū: Jinna no taikei インド古典論理学の研究：陳那の体系. Tokyo: Suzuki gakujutsu zaidan, 1965 — comprehensive study of Dignāga.
  • Douglas Duckworth et al. (trans.), Dignāga’s Investigation of the Percept: A Philosophical Legacy in India and Tibet. Oxford University Press, 2016 — full English translation with commentaries.
  • Tola, Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti, “Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (1982), 105–134.

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