Guān suǒyuányuán lùn 觀所緣緣論

Investigation into the Object-Condition (Ālambana-parīkṣā) by 陳那菩薩 (Dignāga, 造), translated by 玄奘 (Xuánzàng, 譯)

About the work

A single-fascicle verse treatise (kārikā + brief auto-commentary) by 陳那菩薩 Dignāga (c. 480–540), translated into Chinese by 玄奘 (Xuánzàng) in the early Táng. The standard Cí’ēn-school recension of Dignāga’s Ālambana-parīkṣā; the second of two extant Chinese translations after KR6n0111 Wúxiāng sīchén lùn by 真諦 (Paramārtha). Preserved in the Taishō at T31n1624. The Xuánzàng translation became the standard reference text for the work in the Sino-Japanese Yogācāra tradition.

Structural Division

CANWWW preserves a related-text relation T31N1624 ↔ KR6n0113 (T31N1625), pointing to its commentary by 護法菩薩 Dharmapāla. Internally the text is structured as eight verses with prose interjections refuting two views of how the suǒyuányuán 所緣緣 (ālambana-pratyaya, “object-condition” = the cognitive object of the five sense-consciousnesses) is to be analysed.

Prefaces

The text opens directly with a prose introduction stating the doctrinal target: “Those who would have the five consciousnesses (wǔ shí 五識), i.e. the eye-consciousness etc., take external matter (wàisè 外色) as their object-condition either (a) hold the paramāṇu (jíwēi 極微, “ultimate-minute”) to be a real entity capable of generating perception, or (b) hold the aggregation (héhé 和合) [of paramāṇus] to be the object-condition since at the time of perception the [aggregate’s] characteristic appears in [the perception]. Both views are without reason.” The first verse then states the negative thesis: the paramāṇu, in respect of the five consciousnesses, may serve as a condition (yuán 緣) but not as the object-condition (suǒyuán 所緣) — because its characteristic does not appear in the perceptual image, just as the eye-organ does not appear in eye-consciousness.

Abstract

Dignāga’s argument runs in two stages: (1) the atom is not the ālambana because the perceived characteristic is not the atom’s characteristic; (2) the aggregate is not the ālambana because, lacking real essence, it cannot serve as the cause of the perceptual image; therefore the ālambana must be the internal cognitive form (nèisè 內色 / nèishí xiāngfēn 內識相分) that arises within consciousness itself. This is the canonical Yogācāra argument for the vijñapti-mātratā (wéishì 唯識) doctrine in its epistemological formulation.

The Xuánzàng translation is doctrinally somewhat tighter than Paramārtha’s parallel KR6n0111 Wúxiāng sīchén lùn: the technical vocabulary is fully assimilated to Cí’ēn-school usage (suǒyuányuán for ālambana-pratyaya, jíwēi for paramāṇu, xiāngfēn for ākāra / nimitta), and the verses are presented in their canonical eight-verse form. The translation date is conventionally set in Xiǎnqìng 2 = 657 at Cí’ēnsì during Xuánzàng’s productive Yogācāra-translation campaign.

The Xuánzàng version is the platform for the entire late-imperial Chinese commentary tradition: KR6n0113 Guān suǒyuán lùn shì by Dharmapāla / Yìjìng (T31n1625), KR6n0114 Huìshì by 明昱, KR6n0115 Zhíjiě by 智旭, KR6n0116 Shìjì by 明昱, KR6n0117 Shì zhíjiě by 智旭 all derive from this recension.

Translations and research

  • Erich Frauwallner, “Dignāgas Ālambanaparīkṣā,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 37 (1930), 174–194.
  • Hidenori Kitagawa 北川秀則, Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū: Jinna no taikei インド古典論理学の研究:陳那の体系. Tokyo: Suzuki gakujutsu zaidan, 1965.
  • Douglas Duckworth, Malcolm David Eckel, et al. (trans.), Dignāga’s Investigation of the Percept: A Philosophical Legacy in India and Tibet. Oxford University Press, 2016.
  • Tola, Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti, “Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (1982), 105–134.